Abstract. The networks of compromised and remotely controlled computers (bots) are widely used in many Internet fraudulent activities, especially in the distributed denial of service attacks. Brute force gives enormous power to bot masters and makes botnet traffic visible; therefore, some countermeasures might be applied at early stages. Our study focuses on detecting botnet propagation via public websites. The provided algorithm might help with preventing from massive infections when popular web sites are compromised without spreading visual changes used for malware in botnets.
Introduction
The number of attacks against information systems has been increasing significantly over the last few years, and the dynamics of cyber-crime shows a continuous and forceful growth. In most significant cases, botnets were used as the main tool for committing a crime. The measurements performed at the Communications Regulatory Authority of the Republic of Lithuania revealed the following dynamics: in 2008, the total number of unique bots in Lithuania was equal to 1 715, in 2009 -to 70 288 and in 2010 -to 99 249 cases ( Fig. 1) (CRA 2011) . 
Fig. 1. Unique bots detected in Lithuania
Botnets are sophisticated networks organized by as many as possible remotely controlled compromised computers affected by malware programs (bots) which usually are the programs that can have a few or all characteristics of computer viruses, trojans and worms (Juknius et al. 2009 ). Hackers are seeking unpatched, unprotected computers, directly targeting the known system flaws or appealing to poorly educated computer users (Christodorescu et al. 2007) . Depending on bot type, all known malware distribution methods are used with the purpose to affect as many working computers on the Internet as possible (Schiller et al. 2007) . The goal of botnets is to use hijacked computers for various fraudulent online activities. One of them and most dangerous with its massive impact, difficult to trace and defeat is distributed denial-of-service attack (Ramanauskaite et al. 2010) . Due to botnet development it has gone evolution from theoretical to real informational weapons (Juknius et al. 2009 ). Botnets have become effective weapons used for targeted computers and informational systems and a significant threat even on the whole country scale. Historically, such attacks were performed for commercial reasons; nevertheless, attacks against Estonia and Georgia are the examples of obvious warfare in cyberspace with capabilities to affect whole countries. The overall architecture and implementation of botnets is complex and evolving toward the use of common software engineering techniques, for example modularity (Barford et al. 2005) . During the last few years, an increased amount of compromised websites used for infecting unaware visitors with malware for further inclusion into botnets has been noticed.
Botnets with Centralized Command and Controll
The history of botnets started more than 20 years ago when the first bots of IRC (Internet Relay Chat) appeared. At that time, bots were little programs and scripts acting as auxiliaries in online IRC games and channel guards.
The first well known worm PrettyPark emerged to make the use of IRC as a means of remote control of the affected computers. It was connected to a remote IRC (Fig. 2) server and allowed the attacker to retrieve a variety of information about the system. It also had a basic self-update mechanism that permitted downloading and executing a file from IRC. Although it is a rather old way of employing bots and contra measures are well known, the idea of using IRC as the central point of a botnet is still vital as such botnets in many cases are still very effective (Clark et al. 2008) . Centralized, usually IRC based, botnets are connected to on one or several mirrored central servers -Command and Control points (C&C).
Fig. 2. A botnet with the centralized command and control point
After infection and activation, the compromised computers attempt connection to specific, predefined domains using certain ports. Ports usually used in IRC are 6667 and 7000. Using the same ports for botnet communication makes botnet command and control traffic less noticeable to gather with legitimate traffic (Lee et al. 2008) . A bot master can connect directly to the chosen bot, give instructions to a particular bot or all connected bots, manage and reorganize a network until bots are connected to this C&C IRC server. Active bots might be detected using various network monitoring techniques. Continuous network traffic, anomalies or matched signatures might reveal botnet activity (Dunham et al. 2008) ; sometimes it even leads to command and control servers, which helps with cutting threat at its roots, thus disabling current and preventing possible later attack management from the same source.
From a bot master perspective, the weakest part in such botnets is the C&C server. Cutting off the central point makes the whole botnet uncontrolled; in most cases it means that control over all bots might be lost.
Peer-to-Peer and HTTP Botnets
In order to avoid dependence on a single C&C point and make botnets more reliable, the creators of botnets started implementing Peer-to-Peer (P2P) methods well known in file sharing (see Fig. 2 ).
Fig. 3. Peer-to-Peer botnet architecture
At an early stage, botnets are organized by spreading a malicious code and implementing it in as many computers (bots) as possible. Usually after implementation, bots try to connect to the predefined control centers or find each other if they are designed to work in the Peer-to-Peer mode. At that stage, the affected computers try to arrange a controlled network. In many cases, communication traffic between botnets and control centers is the weakest link in the whole botnet structure; sometimes it is the only evidence that such network exists. A peerto-peer approach allows making each affected computer C&C and a bot at the same time. Cutting off a single member of the network has no big influence on the whole botnet.
The P2P-based botnet is very hard to trace and shut down, because the botnet has robust network connectivity, uses encryption and controls traffic dispersion. Each bot influences only a small part of the botnet, and therefore upgrade / recovery is accomplished easily by its botmaster. It might use clique architecture where each clique might have its own encryption key. When the botmaster needs to send information to all nodes, s/he noti-fies one member of each cell who then passes on the information. This creates less traffic than if he broadcasted to all bots. Another advantage is that even if traffic is being monitored on a certain bot, suspicion is not raised if it keeps receiving messages from the same source (Porras et al. 2008 ). In the HTTP based model, to get further instructions, bots are connected to the predefined HTTP servers seeking for instructions. Using HTTP traffic for bot and C&C communication makes bots almost invisible in general Internet traffic and guaranties that the user will not block port 80, on which all his http browsing relies.
Nodes in the peer-to-peer network act as both clients and servers such that there is no centralized coordination point that can be incapacitated. If nodes in the network are taken offline, the gaps in the network are closed and the network continues to operate under control of the botmaster. Another problem posed by P2P botnets to security specialists is difficulty in estimating the size of the P2P botnet (Dittrich et al. 2008 ).
Botnet Propagation via Website Detection Algorithm
It is important to detect early botnet activities in public websites, especially in spreading stage. In cases when a popular compromised site is used for malware propagation, many unaware site visitors can be attacked and become a part of a botnet. Binary checking and methods used in various solutions to malware detection (Li et al. 2007; Juknius et al. 2009; Zhang et al. 2010 ) often fail to identify simple redirection schemes and JavaScript traps. While checking the source of the obviously attacked sites, we found that the website had no malware itself but acted as a redirector to source or performed browser exploitation. When dealing with our algorithm (Fig. 4) , we introduce checking not the malware itself rather than the ways that might lead to it. Although all steps are self explanatory, some additional measures using this algorithm might improve results:
− In many cases we found obvious errors in the website code left after malicious code insertions; problematic areas can be narrowed using HTML standard check.
− Using such algorithm for a remote site checking might be applied periodically, which helps with distinguishing anomalies in the web site code.
− All user agent settings should be adjusted to real values. The checker should act as a real user that will provoke malicious scripts to act naturally and prevent from possible preset contra measures against site administrators (local IP, specific referrers detection).
− Insertion code, especially complex JavaScript solutions in HTML, varies from site to site; we have not found effective way to avoid human inspection in some cases yet. Early botnet detection in websites might prevent from massive problems related to possible infections. 2. We suggest remote site examining, which helps with detecting problems normally hidden from site administrators. 3. Automated inspection provides many false positives especially in cases with using sophisticated JavaScript and dynamic content. 4. Detection rules should be self-updated, the limited amount of the predefined parameters works only when dealing with the known problems.
